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Griswold v. Connecticut and the
Unenumerated Right of Privacy
DAVID HELSCHER*
INTRODUCTION

In 1965, Griswold v. Connecticut' defined a constitutional right of
privacy. In Griswold, the United States Supreme Court first recognized that
there are behavioral matters into which the government may not intrude,
specifically adult consensual marital sexual relations.2 The Court found this
source of privacy rights in two different locations. The majority opinion,
written by Justice Douglas, determined that a notion of privacy surrounding
the Bill of Rights was implicit in the expressed freedoms and prohibitions
of government actions. 3 The second source was an unenumerated right
retained by the people through the Ninth Amendment of the United States
Constitution." The Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution
reads, "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."5 Justice
Goldberg, in his concurring opinion, was the first Justice to attempt to give
substance to the Ninth Amendment, finding privacy a retained right although
unenumerated in the Bill of Rights. For almost 175 years, the Court had
been silent on the content of the Amendment, but now three Justices found
a new constitutional right of privacy to be a retained right and a majority of
the Court found the Ninth Amendment to be a signpost to the existence of
rights not expressly stated in the text.
Griswold still stands as a landmark decision. It has survived as the law
of the land with subsequent refinement and greater definition provided by
later court cases. A right of privacy, one possible right that is unenumerated
or implicit in American liberty, was born fully mature in Griswold. Does

* Member of the Iowa and Illinois Bars; J.D., 1979, Case Western Reserve

University.
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. Id. at 479.
3. Id. at 484.
4. Id.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.

6. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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the history of the adoption of the Ninth Amendment suggest the existence
of rights not expressly stated in the Constitution? Can a right of privacy be
considered implicit in human existence and attach to intimate sexual
matters? How far are the courts willing to go in recognizing a right of
sexual privacy? What source is followed by the courts in protecting sexual
privacy rights, an unenumerated right or a right implicit in the penumbra
surrounding other constitutional guarantees? The extent of a privacy interest
in sexual matters was left to later courts to limit or to expand its application
of the Griswold majority.
I. GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT

Estelle Griswold, Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League
of Connecticut, and Dr. C. Lee Buxton, a medical professor at Yale Medical
School and director of the League's office in New Haven, were convicted
on January 2, 1962, of aiding and abetting in the dissemination of contraceptive devices in violation of Connecticut statutes.7 They were arrested in
1961 for prescribing and giving contraceptive advice and devices to married
persons8 Their conviction was appealed and upheld by the Supreme Court
of Errors for C6nnecticut, which held that it could hold the statute
unconstitutional only if it were an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise by the
legislature of its police power. 9 Jurisdiction was noted and certiorari was
granted by the United States Supreme Court.10
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding the Connecticut
Griswold resulted in six written opinions.
statute unconstitutional."
Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion, finding an implicit guarantee
emanating from the spirit of express protections of the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment.'" Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion,
joined in by two other Justices, struck out in a radical direction. He found
a constitutionally protected interest outside of express text and implicit

7. Id. at 479. Connecticut General Statute § 53-32 provided: "Any person who uses
any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be
fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year
or be both fined and imprisoned." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958). Section 54-196
provided: "Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to
commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender."
Id. § 54-196 (1958).
8. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
9. Connecticut v. Griswold, 200 A.2d 479, 480 (Conn. 1964).
10. Griswold v. Connecticut, 379 U.S. 926, 926(1964).
11. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
12. Id. at 481-84.
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guarantees but among rights the people retained.13 These rights were
reserved in the express language of the Ninth Amendment. 14 Justice Black
wrote a strong dissent that incorporated most of the major criticisms of
contemporary commentators. 5 These objections were that there was no
explicit textual support for a right of privacy, the Court's reliance on the
Ninth Amendment opened the door to the recognition or creation of
untethered rights and interests according to the personal whims of the Court
and judges, and the Ninth Amendment was only intended to be a rule of
construction of the previous eight amendments and not a source of rights. 6
Justice Douglas' opinion held the Connecticut statute unconstitutional
as it violated a constitutional right of privacy.17 Privacy was a peripheral
right found from emanations from specific constitutional guarantees in the
Bill of Rights.' 8 The penumbras formed by these guarantees created zones
of privacy around the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments,
necessary to provide for the protection of the rights specifically guaranteed
under each of these amendments.' 9 This zone of privacy was constitutionally protected from state action by application of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 20
Douglas' opinion spends considerable time using the First Amendment 2' to argue that an association of people is not specifically mentioned
in the Constitution, yet, association is a necessary corollary to expression of

13. Id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, I., concurring).
14. Id. at 496.
15. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text for further discussion regarding the
dissenting opinion.
16. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507-27 (Black, J., dissenting).
17. Id.at 485.
18. Id.
19. Id.at 484.
20. Id. at 481-82. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV., § 1.
21. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend.
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opinion so as to protect it.22 The right to association is an emanation from
the First Amendment that affords association a protected status.23 Marriage
is such a protected association, and the Connecticut statute was unnecessarily destructive to this association, and was therefore unconstitutional. 24
In addition to the existence of zones of privacy emanating from the
intent and purposes of the Bill of Rights, Douglas found a right of marital
privacy that predated the Bill of Rights.25 It is at the foundation of the
safeguards of liberty as expressed in the Bill of Rights. 26 The Supreme
Court was not intended to be a super-legislature that ruled upon the wisdom
of state legislative enactments by use of a general notion of liberty,27 but
the Court served to protect those liberties necessary to a free society.28
Douglas' notion of liberty anticipates Justice Black's dissent. The dissent
attacks an overly broad standard of liberty and warns of a return to court
supervision of economic and social legislation. Douglas distinguishes this
early "substantive due process" examination by the Court as not dealing with
any particular prohibition of the Constitution. 29 His current definition of
protected liberty interests comes from rights emanating from specific
prohibitions in the Bill of. Rights or the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. °
Justice Black, in his dissent, dismisses Justice Douglas' First Amendment argument, since the violation in question involved action rather than
22. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.

23. Id. at 482-83.
24. Id. at 485.
25. Id. at 486.

26. Id. at 484 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(addressing a constitutional challenge to the same Connecticut statutes as Griswold)J.

27. id. at 482.
28. In his dissent in Poe, Justice Douglas stated:

Yet to say that a legislature may do anything not within a specific guarantee of the
Constitution may be as crippling to a free society as to allow it to override specific
guarantees so long as what it does fails to shock the sensibilities of a majority of

the Court.
Poe, 367 U.S. at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 517-18.
30. Id. at 520-21.
But when the State makes 'use' a crime and applies the criminal sanction to man
and wife, the State has entered into the innermost sanctum of the home. If it can
make this law, it can enforce it. And proof of its violation necessarily involves an
inquiry into the relations between man and wife. That is an invasion of the privacy
that is implicit in a free society .... This notion of privacy is not drawn from the
blue. It emanates from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we
live.
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mere speech. 3 1 Black had a series of concerns with the Court's opinion
being a usurpation of legislative function, sitting in judgment of the
desirability, reasonableness, offensiveness or purpose of statutes.32
Justice Black found no textual or historical support for the conclusions
33
of the majority opinion or the concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg.
He found that the Court's conclusions were based upon theories of natural
law through which the particular biases and personal and private notions of
individual judges would be substituted for specific textual guarantees of the
Constitution. 34 Black was unconvinced that the Ninth Amendment was
anything other than a limitation on the central government,35 and that if
additional rights were to be created, there was a constitutional process for
36
the majority of the people to amend the Constitution.
Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion, although not the majority
opinion of the Court, struck out in a different direction in finding a
constitutionally protected right of privacy. Agreeing with the majority
opinion of Douglas that liberty protects fundamental rights and these rights
are not limited to specific terms or explicit guarantees of the Bill of
Rights, 37 Goldberg found protection of privacy interests 3 through the
39
Ninth Amendment.
Goldberg did not find the Ninth Amendment to be an independent
source of constitutional rights.40 The Ninth, when considered with fundamental notions of liberty and due process, lent support to constitutional
protections that extended beyond the explicit text of the Constitution.4 He
found support for this in the history of the adoption of the Ninth Amendment.4" He looked to giving meaning to all the words of the Constitution
31. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507-08 (Black, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 513 (Black, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 519 (Black, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 519-27 (Black, J., dissenting).
35. id. at 520 (Black, J., dissenting). "That [Ninth] Amendment was passed, not to
broaden the powers of this Court or any other department of 'the General Government', but
...to assure the people that the Constitution in all its provisions was intended to limit the
Federal Government to the powers granted expressly or by necessary implication." Id.
36. Id. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The Ninth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides: "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
40. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring). "The language and history of the Ninth
Amendment reveal that the Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional
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and independent significance to the Ninth Amendment rather than43treating
the language of the Ninth Amendment as a redundancy or truism.
The source of these implicit rights, unenumerated but retained by the
Ninth Amendment derived from three sources: first, the "'[t]raditions and
[collective] conscience of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so
rooted [there] . . . as to be ranked fundamental;"'" second, the denial of
a right would violate "[t]hose 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions;'" 45 and, third,
notions of liberty which gain content from "[e]manations of . . . specific
[constitutional] guarantees" and "from experience with the requirements of
a free society."46 Goldberg went no further to define the sources of these
rights.
Goldberg was willing to limit the breadth of his opinion so as not to
create a zone of privacy in sexual matters. The specific resolution of the
constitutionality of the Connecticut statute dealt with marital privacy
only.47 Specifically, he felt that there may be areas of sexual conduct or
misconduct that were within the realm of state regulation that would
withstand constitutional challenge. s
II. UNENUMERATED RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Justice Goldberg referred to the language and history of the Ninth

fundamental rights, protected from government infringement, which exist alongside those
fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments." Id.
43. Id. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934)).
45. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67
(1932)).
46. Id. at 493-94 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 517
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
47. Id. at 496-98 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)):
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State forbids
... but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted
feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State not only must
allow, but which always and in every age it has fostered and protected. It is one
thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-marital sexuality ...
or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when, having acknowledged a
marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the
criminal law the details of that intimacy.
Poe, 367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Amendment and cited James Madison and Justice Story in his opinion.49
The history of the enactment of the Ninth Amendment lends support to the
argument of the existence of unenumerated rights under the Constitution.
When the Constitution was submitted to the states for ratification, a major
concern was the lack of a Bill of Rights.50 Proponents of a Bill of Rights
feared that not enumerating the rights would result in their exclusion lost.51
A common belief held by the framers of the Constitution was the idea,
borrowed from John Locke, that individuals are free in a state of nature, but
when they form a government, rights and powers are delegated to that
government unless reserved by the people.52 Others felt that any attempt
to enumerate all rights retained by the people would result in the unintended
exclusion of some, resulting in a construction that they had been delegated
to the central government, or that the rights of individuals were too
numerous as to be impossible to enumerate. 3
James Madison fell into this latter category, believing that any attempt
at an exhaustive listing of rights retained by the people and not delegated
would be too narrow. 4 It was therefore unnecessary to enumerate these
rights as they existed independent of government, reflecting a significant
sentiment of the times. 5 Madison privately confided that he was opposed
to an amendment that was more limiting of the powers delegated to the
central government for fear of constricting the ability of the government to
react to some future, unimagined, event.5 6 It is possible that Madison
opposed a similar enumeration of rights for fear of excluding and implicitly
delegating rights. Although Alexander Hamilton argued these points in The
Federalist Papers,57 it was necessary to compromise and promise that a bill
49. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 489-90 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
50. R.H. Clark, Ninth Amendment and Constitutional Privacy, 5 U. TOL. L. REV. 83,
87 (1973).
51. R. Kaplan, The Histoty and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV.
223, 239-40 (1983).
52. Id. at 229-38.
53. Id. at 239-40. See also Clark, supra note 50, at 88-89.
54. Clark, supra note 50, at 103.
55. James F. Kelley, The UncertainRenaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CHI.
L. REv. 814, 823 (1966).
56. Clark, supra note 50, at 100-01.
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton wrote:
It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights are, in their origin,
stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgments of prerogative, in favor
of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince.... It is evident,
therefore, that, according to their primitive signification, they nave no application
to constitutions, professedly founded upon the power of the people, and executed
by their immediate representatives and servants. Here, in strictness, the people
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of rights would be a priority of the first Congress under the new Constitution."
A strong Federalist contingent in the first Congress attempted to defeat
consideration of a bill of rights, but the threat of a second constitutional
convention resulted in the House of Representatives, as a committee of the
whole, to consider amendments.5 9 Madison submitted proposals which
included section ten of the fourth resolution:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution,
made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights
retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers
delegated by the Constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution.'
Madison explained this proposal on June 8, 1789, as necessary to meet the
objections voiced during the process of ratification of the Constitution.6
He further explained how he attempted to meet these objections by including
the provision in the last clause of the fourth resolution of the proposals that
had been submitted for consideration by the entire House of Representatives. 62
surrender nothing; and as they retain every thing they have no need of particular
reservations.... I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the
extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed
Constitution, but would even be dangerous.
Id. at 825-33.
58. A.F. Ringold, History of the Enactment of Ninth Amendment and its Recent
Development, 8 TULSA L. J. 1, 6 (1972).
59. Clark, supra note 50, at 92.
60. Ringold, supra note 58, at 7; See also Floyd Abrams, What are the Rights
Guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment?, 53 A.B.A. J. 1033, 1033-35 (1967) (citing I ANNALS
OF CONG. 747, 435, 437 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1834).
61. Kaplan, supra note 51, at 253 (citing I ANNALS OF CONG. at 450 (Gales & Seaton
eds., 1834)). "1believe that the great mass of the people opposed, disliked [the Constitution]
because it did not contain effectual provisions against encroachments on particular rights, and
those safeguards which they have been long accustomed to have interposed between them
and the magistrate who exercises the sovereign power." Id.
62. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 489-91,(1965) (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
439 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1834)).
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular
exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not
placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those rights
which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the
General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most
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Madison's proposal was submitted to a House Select Committee to
draft amendments and incorporate debated points. The last clause of the
fourth resolution was amended and resubmitted to the House which read:
"The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."6 3 In its final
form and as adopted by Congress and submitted for ratification, the phrase
"this Constitution" was changed to "the Constitution" and a comma was
added after "Constitution."' The ratified amendment remains unaltered or
amended to date.
Madison's initial opposition to enumeration of rights was satisfied by
the Ninth Amendment. It would protect against encroachment on rights by
the federal government under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the
Constitution. This clause provided the means of government while the
Ninth Amendment and Bill of Rights set out ends that may not be
encroached upon by the government. 65 Not all states during Madison's
time had Bills of Rights,' but many of the framers of the Constitution
were familiar with or adherents of natural law. The American experiment
in a written constitution may have had the unintended effect of giving
meaning to the legal maxim that the expression of one is the exclusion of
another. This was another reason for the inclusion of the Ninth Amendment,
as a rule of construction In interpreting the document it amended. 67 This
more than forty years following the
was the opinion of Justice Story, writing
68
ratification of the Ninth Amendment.
Justice Goldberg did not have much authority to rely on when basing
his decision upon the unenumerated rights of the Ninth Amendment. No
Supreme Court case had given any substantive content to the amendment
nor had a decision been based upon it. 69 In fact, the Ninth Amendment

Id.

plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of
rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have
attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth
resolution [the Ninth Amendment].
63. Abrams, supra note 60, at 1035.

64. Id.
65. Clark, supra note 50, at 92-93. See also Randy Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth
Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 (1988).
66. Clark, supra note 50, at 92-93.

67. Id. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 825-33 (Alexander Hamilton); Kaplan,
supra note 51, at 260.

68. Justice Joseph Story, III

STATES,

§ 1898, 751-52 (1833).

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrruTION OF THE UNITED

69. Norman Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights... Retained By the People?," 37

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

was generally considered to be only a technical rule of construction or a
relic made obsolete by the Fourteenth Amendment. 70 In the most significant Ninth Amendment case, prior to Griswold, the Supreme Court merely
stated the truism that a specific grant of power to Congress must control
over the general retention of rights by the people under the Ninth Amendment.7 1
Where then did Justice Goldberg suddenly find a basis within the long
dormant Ninth Amendment? It might be suggested that the Ninth Amendment stands as a last bastion of individual liberties when all other explicit
or implicit rights have been exhausted. Earlier courts had found infringements upon liberty unconstitutional based on the Contract, Equal Protection,
or Due Process Clauses, 72 or based on the substantive due process arguments that had been discredited. 73 This latter line of cases was discredited
because it relied on judicial wisdom of economic regulation, under the
rubric of liberty and freedom, for that of the legislature. Goldberg sought
out a more explicit constitutional mandate for invalidating the Connecticut
statute, the unenumerated rights retained by the people under the Ninth
Amendment. Goldberg's willingness to move beyond the express language
of the Constitution may have been due to his conception of precedent or
stare decisis. After leaving the Court, he addressed the Warren Court's
willingness to give broader meaning to constitutional guarantees of liberty
so as to address the Court's decisions impact on human events.74 In the
opinions of Douglas and Goldberg, the right of marital sexual privacy was
older than the Bill of Rights and was held so dear as to be almost sacred.
N.Y.U. L. REV. 787, 808 (1962).
70. Ringold, supra note 58, at 11-17.
71. Abrams, supra note 60, at 1036 (citing United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75, 95-96 (1947)).
72. G. Sidney Buchanan, The Right of Privacy: Past, Presentand
Future, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 403, 407-08 (1990); see also Luis Kutner, Neglected Ninth
Amendment: The Other Rights Retained by the People, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 121, 126-27
(1967).
73. Buchanan, supra note 72, at 411-14.
74. A. ARTHUR GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE, THE WARREN ERA OF THE SUPREME
COURT, in ROSENTHAL LECTURES, NORTHWEsTERN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW (1971).
[A] basic characteristic of the role of stare decisis in constitutional laws certain
factors weaken the doctrine's commands when the Court moves to expand personal
liberties in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution, while stare decisis
retains its full vigor or even gains forcefulness in forbidding contraction of liberty
... fundamental personal liberties were instilled with an innate capacity for growth
to enable then to meet new evils.
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These rights were not delegated to the sovereign nor was the power to
regulate them expressly delegated to the government by the Constitution.
Therefore, this ancient right was retained by the people.
Goldberg's reasoning may have its source in an article written in 1962
by Norman Redlich, then a professor of law at New York University,
addressing the Connecticut case." The author correctly predicted the
positions of Justices Douglas and Harlan,76 but suggested a third course for
invalidating the Connecticut statute, the "discovery" of the Ninth Amendment as a statement of rights retained by the people, an essential ingredient
of a free society," and uniquely situated, by its history, to address the
Connecticut birth control statute 78 or other "governmental intrusions into
basic personal relationships7 9... which have hitherto been relegated to the
domain of science-fiction.
But what are these rights and is privacy among them? If no word,
expression or clause of the Constitution is superfluous,80 then the plain
meaning of the Ninth Amendment is that there were rights in existence at
the time of the Constitution's adoption which continue to exist today.8'
The independent states ratified the Constitution with a pre-condition that a
Bill of Rights be adopted.8 2 These unenumerated rights could have had
their source in natural law (e.g., rights inherent in the fact of being human),
or, more likely, those rights were known to exist to the Framers under the
English common law. 3

75. See generally, Redlich, supra note 69.
76. Id. at 799-801.

77. Id.

78. Id. at 804.
79. Id. at 802.
80. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803); See also, Knowlton
H. Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L. J. 309, 312 (193536).
81. See Kelsey, supra note 80, at 323.
Surely it is more than a mere negative on implied grants of power that might
otherwise be asserted because of the express enumeration of rights in respect of
matters where no power was granted. It must be more than a mere net to catch fish
in supposedly fishless waters. It is certainly more than a mere emphasis on the
doctrine of delegated and enumerated powers. It must be a positive declaration of
existing, though unnamed rights, which may be vindicated under the authority of
the Amendment whenever and if ever any governmental authority shall aspire to
ungranted power in contravention of "unenumerated rights."
Id.
82. Id. at 314-18.
83. Id.
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A constitutional right of privacy was not created out of the blue by
Justices Douglas or Goldberg. As already suggested, such a right had been
previously suggested to exist under the Ninth Amendment." Prior to
Griswold, a right of privacy was based on a common law tort, or personal
injury action which provided for civil relief and remedies for intrusion upon
an individual. By 1960, a majority of the states recognized the tort of
invasion of privacy.85
Early English and American common law cases developed a privacy
theory rooted in a property interest, such as private letters, or in an implied
contract or trust, such as trade secrets or formulas.86 Privacy may not have
been an issue in a mostly rural and remote colonial America that had a
relatively homogeneous population."
An abstract notion of privacy interests came about in a 1890 law
review article co-authored by Louis Brandeis,88 later a U.S. Supreme Court
Justice, as a response to the authors' annoyance with press accounts of their
social activities. 89 The authors advanced a notion that privacy extends
beyond physical intrusion, harm, or taking of a proprietary interest, to a
notion of an "inviolate personality.' '90 Prior case law looked to some
implied consent or contractual relationship between the parties, but by 1890,
the authors felt technology had raced ahead of such notions. 9, They called
for the recognition of a right of privacy to protect this personality or
personhood which they felt was increasingly subjected to intrusions. 92 This

84. Kelsey, supra note 80, at 321. See also Redlich, supra note 69, at 808-09.
85. William M. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 386-88 (1960).
86.

See MORRIS L. ERNST & ALAN U. SCHWARTZ, THE RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE

(1962); see also P.

ALLAN DIONISOPOULOS & CRAIG R. DUCAT, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY:

ESSAYS AND CASES, 21-25 (1976).

87. Thomas H. O'Connor, The Right to Privacy in Historical Perspective, 53 MASS.
L. Q. 101, 103-09 (1968).
88. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
89. ERNST & SCHWARTZ, supra note 86, at 46; Prosser, supra note 85, at 383.
90. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 88, at 205.
91. Id. at 206. "If, then, the decisions indicate a general right to privacy for thoughts,
emotions, and sensations, these should receive the same protection, whether expressed in
writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in attitudes, or in facial expression." Id.
92. Id. at 213. The author stated:
The principle which protects personal writings and any other productions of the
intellect or of the emotions, is the right to privacy, and the law has no new
principle to formulate when it extends this protection to the personal appearance,
sayings, acts and to personal relation, domestic or otherwise .... The application

of an existing principle to a new state of facts is not judicial legislation. To call it
such is to assert that the existing body of law consists practically of the statutes
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article had an almost immediate impact upon American law. As early as
1894, a federal court recognized the existence of an actionable privacy
interest 93 but created an exception when the intrusion was a photographic
image of a public figure. This was followed by two state court cases, one
disallowing an action,94 and another recognizing the cause of action and
favorably citing the 1890 law review article. 9 Between 1905 and 1965,
there were approximately 350 reported cases of injury due to an alleged
invasion of privacy, based on a variety of actions, theories and defenses. 96
An attempt to categorize the intrusions was made and four general
categories were found:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or
into his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the
plaintiffs name or likeness. 97
In this sense, the Warren-Brandeis thesis of a privacy tort is too broad
and consists of four distinct torts that fill the gaps between other personal
injuries, but lack a common theme. 9 In direct response to this assertion
is an opposing argument: a common theme of protection from seizure of

Id.

and decided cases, and to deny that the principles (of which these cases are
ordinarily said to be evidence) exist at all. It is not the application of an existing
principle to new cases, but the introduction of a new principle, which is properly
termed judicial legislation.... Indeed, the elasticity of our law, its adaptability to
new conditions, the capacity for growth, which has enabled it to meet the wants
of an ever changing society and to apply immediate relief for every recognized
wrong, have been its greatest boast.

93. Carliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280 (D. Mass. 1894). See also ERNST &
supra note 86, at 74; Prosser, supra note 85, at 385.
94. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box, 64 N.E. 442 (1902) (later remedied by
statutory creation of cause of action by New York legislature). See also ERNST &
SCHWARTZ, supra note 86, at 108, 127-29.
95. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (1905). See also ERNST &
SCHWARTZ, supra note 86 at 130.
96. William M. Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 258 (1966).
97. Prosser, supra note 85, at 389.
98. Id. at 392.
SCHWARTZ,
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individuality, human dignity or personhood that is beyond the freedom from
search and seizure afforded by the Fourth Amendment when it is the
government that intrudes upon the privacy of the individual." A necessary
element of common law tort is that injury result from some breach of duty
owed to an individual. This would necessarily imply that there be an
intrusion upon an individual for an actionable breach of a right of privacy.
As has been asserted, there is a common thread of an interest to be
safeguarded beyond protection of the physical being in seclusion. The
everyday meaning of privacy implies seclusion, while a right of individuality, personhood or human dignity can be a freedom from intrusion, whether
by government or individuals, upon the individual's personality, emotions,
thoughts, sensations and those things that are at the core of being human.
Louis Brandeis, co-author of the law review article which has been
called the virtual beginning of the recognition of the right of privacy," 0
became a Supreme Court Justice. Almost forty years after first proposing
his right of privacy, he was able to articulate a constitutional basis of such
a right:
The protection guaranteed by the [Fourth and Fifth]
Amendments is much broader in scope. The makers of
the Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone--the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.'0 '
Several decades later, Justice Douglas was able to expand on Brandeis'
notion of a right to privacy beyond the express language of the Constitution.
In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollack,"°2 it was asserted that an
individual's constitutional liberty was infringed upon by radio broadcasts

99. DIONISOPOULOS & DUCAT, supra note 86, at 27-28: Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy
As an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1964).
100. H.R. Rodgers Jr., New Era for Privacy, 43 N.D. L. REV. 253 (1967).
101. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).

102. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
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played over a public transit's speaker system. 0 3 The Court held that
constitutional liberty did not extend that far, relying on reliance upon the
transit authority's hearings on the matter and public opinion polls." °
Justice Douglas, writing in dissent, found the broadcasts a form of coercion,
forcing those riding the transit to listen. Such benign action could lead to
a dominant political or religious group attempting to control speech and
philosophies, striking at the heart of diversity, individual choices and
constitutional liberty. 105
Still later, in 1963, a right of privacy was found to exist under civil
rights statutes and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." A claim, based in part on an invasion of privacy, was filed by
a woman who was photographed in the nude, by a policeman, as part of an
investigation of an assault charge the woman had filed. Despite her
objections that bruising would not be seen in the suggestive poses requested
by the officer, copies were made and distributed among the police
department.107 The lower court dismissed the claim for failure to state a
claim under which she could recover, including an invasion of her privacy
and deprivation of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 0 8 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and found the facts
sufficient to warrant a claim for a deprivation of constitutional liberty and
an unwarranted invasion of a privacy interest in the image of her nude
body."° This set the stage for Griswold. A privacy interest had been
recognized in common law tort with comment and allusion to a broader
constitutional interest in privacy: freedom from searches and seizures under
the Fourth Amendment; liberty interests under the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and an interest rooted in choice
under the First Amendment.
III. CONTEMPORARY COMMENT OF GRISWOLD
Scholarly comment on the Supreme Court's decision was somewhat
muted. Much of the criticism mirrored the objections raised in Justice
Black's dissent. The Court had created a right without textual support; the
standards to be used to find the existence of unenumerated rights would
foster the creation of rights based on the personal prejudices and biases of
103. Id.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at
York
Id.
108. York,
109. Id. at

469 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963).
324 F.2d at 452.
455.
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judges. Additionally, the "discovery" of rights through the Ninth Amendment was another attempt at resurrecting the discredited economic due
process arguments. Goldberg's opinion evoked comment and criticism as
it drew from the Ninth Amendment which had not previously been a basis
for a decision of the Court. Some commentators felt his opinion was "philosophically idealistic" and highly subjective,"1 while others called it an
"interesting tour de force" which added little to constitutional development
other than another basis for defining liberty without straying too far from the
Goldberg was said to have merely drawn
test of the Constitution.'
the then current state of the law to define
of
together divergent elements
2
privacy.
Much of the negative criticism was aimed at a perceived risk of the
judiciary attempting to define what rights are retained but unenumerated.
It was feared that this could lead to the Court acting as a super-legislature
over both Congress and state legislatures by making policy decisions. This
was the same objection raised in the Griswold dissent." 3 This uncertainty
of definition could resurrect the flexible due process approach previously
discredited in a line of economic regulation cases mentioned in Justice
Black's dissent.1 4 It was feared the Supreme Court would become the
maker of policy as well as the interpreter of the Constitution. 5 The fear
of unbridled judicial activism was met with the argument that the judiciary
is the weakest component of the federal triad, subject to its own selfrestraint, legislative limitation of judicial review and Senate confirmation of
nominated judges. 6
The Supreme Court had previously created a hierarchy of the rights
and protections afforded, 1 7 but Griswold did not give clear direction as
to what standard of review should be given to moral legislation when it

110. Ernest E. Katin, Griswold v. Connecticut: The Justices and Connecticut's
"Uncommonly Silly Law," 42 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 680, 685 (1967).
111. Paul G. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries,Emanations, Things Fundamental and
Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235, 254 (1965).
112. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charterfor an
Expanded Law of Privacy?,64 MICH. L. REV. 197 (1965).
113. William 0. Bertelsman, The Ninth Amendment and Due Process of Law-Toward
a Viable Theory of Unenumerated Rights, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 777, 778-87 (1968).
114. Robert B. McKay, The Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations, 64 MICH.
L. REV. 259, 270 (1965).
115. Frank R. Goldstein, The Constitutional Rights of Privacy- "A Sizable Hunk of
Liberty," 26 MD. L. REv. 249, 256-57 (1966).
116. Clark, supra note 50, at 95-96; see also Kutner, supra note 72, at 133-34.
117. Kauper, supra note 11, at 251.
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invades both privacy and economic regulation."' In light of Griswold, the
state's ability to exercise its police power to regulate morality would require
review and court challenges. There were several different theories.
announced by members of the Griswold majority, lending themselves to
continued probing by litigants. 9
The definition of what rights were unenumerated and what interests
were to be protected was also left open to speculation. Sources of such
rights could be natural law, ° objective standards of universal rights such
as suggested by the United Nations 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,"' or an open ended meaning to be defined in a contemporary
context and requirements of a free and open society.122
As Griswolddealt with marital sexual privacy, it could be read that the
state may not intrude into consensual practices of marital privacy."2 The
case did leave open whether the state may regulate any form of private adult
consensual sexual activity without running afoul of constitutionally protected
privacy."l
In a pluralistic society, it might not be possible to regulate
sexual morality other than in terms of public peace, use of force or
minors."' However, cases to be decided after Griswold could limit the
decision to the specific facts," 6 a right of privacy concerning family
planning decisions or a freedom from state intrusion into marital conjugal
privileges."7

118. Thomas I. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219,
225-27 (1965).
119. See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 112, at 205; Emerson, supra note 118, at 220; Note,
The Ninth Amendment, 11 San Diego L. Rev. 172 (1960).
120. Bertelsman, supra note 113, at 794-95.
121. Id. at 787-90.
122. Kutner, supra note 72, at 134-42.
123. Emerson, supra note 118, at 231-32.

124. Id. See also Irv. S. Goudman, Comment, The Bedroom Should Not be Within the
Province of the Law, 4 CAL. W. L. REv. 115, 123-26 (1968); Mike White, Comment,
ConstitutionalLaw - Connecticut Contraceptive Ban v. Right to Privacy, 34 UMKC L. REv.

95, 120 (1966).

125. June A. Eichbaum, Louisi v. Slayton: Constitutional Privacy and Sexual

Expression, 10 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 525; Goudman, supra note 124; Katin, supra
note 110, at 705.
126. Katin, supra note 110, at 705.
127. Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: Supreme Court Finds Marital Privacy Immunized
From State Intrusion as a Bill of Rights Periphery, 1966 DuKE L.J. 562, 577.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

IV. SUBSEQUENT COURT CASES

The court cases subsequent to Griswold had a variety of approaches
they. could follow given the different members of the Court's majority in the
case. A right of privacy in sexual matters could be applicable only in cases
of private adult consensual heterosexual reproductive behavior. The court
cases also tied the right of privacy to some textual support in the Constitution. These tethers to the Constitution could be the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and an individual's
The textual support could be found in First
expectation of privacy."2
speech and implicit guarantees of expresfor
Amendment protections
129
Another textual nexus used was the Fourteenth Amendment's
sion.
Equal Protection Clause." No case would recognize the naked assertion
of an unenumerated right of privacy independent of other textual guarantees,
rights or prohibitions of government action.
A head-on attack of unenumerated rights was made to negate any
presumption of their existence. Judge Bork's opinion in Dronenberg v.
Zech 3' negated the existence of any rights, penumbral or otherwise,
without an explicit or implicit textual relationship."' The latest Supreme
Court decision of Bowers v. Hardwick'33 confirmed the objections and
fears of Justice Black. A majority of the Court disguised their personal
prejudices in terms of religious traditions and a history of social majoritarian
oppression of a minority in denying due process protection to private adult
consensual sexual activity without addressing the Ninth Amendment rights
retained by the people." 4 As Justice Black had warned, the Court had

substituted its notions, biases and prejudices of morality and decency for a
right of private intimate association.'
It was only a matter of months before the Griswold privacy doctrine
13 6
was used in a criminal prosecution case. In Smayda v. United States,
defendants were convicted of violating a statute proscribing oral copulation

128.
(1966).
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 456 (1972).
741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (1984).
Id.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Id. at 192-94.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 380 U.S. 479, 519-26 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966).
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in a men's toilet and washroom in Yosemite National Park.13 7 The toilet
was a stall variety with a door that could not be locked or latched. 3 '
Officials suspected criminal activities, cut a hole in the roof and conducted
visual and photographic surveillance of criminal activity. 39 The majority
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, while recognizing a right of privacy
and citing Griswold, found that the privacy interest to be protected is
dependent upon an expectation of privacy, balanced against the public
interest in law enforcement." 4 The dissent in this case, attacks the majority opinion, based on the assumption that there would be an expectation of
privacy, free from police surveillance, in an enclosed public toilet.14' This
case involved the Fourth Amendment search and seizure clause. 42 The
defendants' argument was that the method in which the evidence was
obtained proved to be an unreasonable intrusion upon a competing privacy
interest rather than a prohibition from state regulation of activity. 3
In Stanley v. Georgia,'" the defendant was convicted of the possession of obscene films, which were seized in a raid on his home conducted
to investigate illegal gambling activities. 4 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the conviction, holding that making mere possession of
obscene films a crime was violative of the First and Fourteenth AmendQuoting Justice Brandeis from Olmstead v. United States, 147
ments. 1'
the Court held that those rights asserted by the defendant were "to satisfy
his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home,,' 4
and the First Amendment prevents government control of individual's minds
and thoughts. Emphasis was placed on the fact that the materials in the
possession of the defendant were in his private home, for private viewing
only.' 49 The Court in Paris Adult Theater I v. Staton,1 ° reinforced this
privacy interest in the home while limiting its extension beyond the home,
by refusing to extend the intellectual and emotional needs to privately view
137. Id. at 251-53.

138. Id.
139. Id. at 252-53.

140. Id.
141. Id. at 260 (Pope, J., dissenting).
142. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Smayda, 352 F.2d at 252, 256.
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Id. at 557.
Id. at 568.
277 U.S. 438 (1928).

148. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564-65.

149. Id.
150. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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The Court further held
obscene films to consenting adults in a theater."
adults are beyond the reach of
that not all activities between consenting
52
government intrusion by regulation.'
In the area of contraception, the Court was requested to create a
distinction between non-criminal dissemination of birth control devices to
a married person and the criminal action if the person were unmarried. In
3 the Court held that creating a distinction, based on
Eisenstadt v. Baird,"1
marital status, when a constitutionally protected privacy interest arises,
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with
a mind and a heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child.' 5'
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, criticized the opinion as judicial policy
making. He felt this was judicial overextension into the legislative spheres
56
of the states."
A direct challenge to a Virginia sodomy statute was made on the basis,
in part, on the First and Ninth Amendment guarantees of privacy."17 Two
adult males challenged the statute as they were threatened with criminal
prosecution for their active, regular, consensual, homosexual practices in
private.1"8 The federal district court held the criminal regulation of
homosexual activity by the state to be constitutional." 9 Addressing the
Griswold privacy issue, the district court stated:
Precedents cited ... rest exclusively on the precept that
the Constitution condemns state legislation that trespasses
upon the privacy of the incidents of marriage, upon the

151. Id. at 49.
152. Id. at 65.

153. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
154. Id. at 443.

155. Id. at 453-54 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).

156. Id. at 467-68 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
157. Doe v. City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200 (E.D. Va. 1975), reh'g denied,

425 U.S. 901 (1976).

158. Id. at 1200.
159. Id. at 1203.
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sanctity of the home, or upon the nature of family life.
This and only this concern has been the justification for
nullification of State regulation in this area."6
The district court ignored the case of Eisenstadt,where no marriage or home
existed, and avoidance of family was a reason for an unmarried person
seeking contraceptives.16 Again avoiding Eisenstadt, the court held that
the state need only establish that homosexuality is likely to end in the
contribution to moral delinquency, rather than actually show the results of
such activity to provide a legitimate state interest in regulation.162 The
decision was summarily affirmed, without written opinion, by the Supreme
Court, leaving the decision limited to the facts of the case. A dissent, filed
by one of the federal district court judges, draws a different conclusion from
the Griswold privacy cases and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment:
I view these cases as standing for the principle that every
individual has a right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into one's decisions on private matters of
intimate concern. A mature individual's choice of an
adult sexual partner, in the privacy of his or her home,
would appear to me to be a decision of the utmost private
and intimate concern. Private consensual sex acts between adults are matters, absent evidence that they are
harmful, in which the state has no legitimate interest. 63
By drawing upon those cases not mentioned by the majority opinion, i.e.,
Eisenstadt and Roe v. Wade,'(' the dissenter makes the point that the
majority has misconstrued the issue as one of morality or decency, rather
than constitutional privacy."
In 1983, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
was called upon to resolve a similar challenge to a naval discharge due to
homosexual conduct. 6 The three-judge panel included Robert Bork and
Antonin Scalia, both soon to be nominated for confirmation to the Supreme
Court. Judge Bork, who wrote the opinion, denied that the Griswold line
160. Id. at 1200.

161. Id.
162. Id. at 1200

163. Id. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
164. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

165. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1205 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
166. Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 746 F.2d 1579
(1984).
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67
of cases guaranteed a person's freedom to control intimate decisions,'
specifically homosexual activities.'" Privacy related to matters of "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education." The court reasoned that to include homosexual activities in the
concept of privacy so as to be fundamental was to open the door to all
Rather than creating new
private sexual activity being so protected.'
constitutional rights, Judge Bork chose to defer to moral choices of a
majoritarian legislature. 7 ° Bork also attacked the majority holding in
Griswold:

The "penumbra" was no more than a perception that it is
sometimes necessary to protect actions or associations not
guaranteed by the Constitution in order to protect an
activity that is. The penumbral right has no life of its
own as a right independent of its relationship to a first
amendment freedom. Where the relationship does not
exist, the penumbral right evaporates.171
Without a tether to the Constitution, a penumbral right would fail. Without
some implicit connection to the Constitution, would not the same occur to
unenumerated rights, such as privacy? In a bitter dissent to a denial to rehear
en banc, Bork was criticized for imposing his own preferred doctrine for
precedent, thereby constricting personal liberties.'72 The Senate's rejection
of Robert Bork's nomination the Supreme Court was due, at least in part,
to his rejection of penumbral rights and unenumerated rights under the Ninth
Amendment.'
Finally, in 1986, the Supreme Court ruled that homosexual activity is
not a fundamental right within the meaning of liberty under the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 74 In Bowers v. Hardwick, the court of appeals held that a Georgia criminal sodomy statute violated
a fundamental private and intimate association protected by the Ninth and
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that to
Fourteenth Amendments.'
confer constitutional status on homosexual activity would invalidate many
167. Id. at 1391.

168. Id. (citing Justice Harlan's dicta in Poe v. Ullman and Doe v. City of Richmond).
169. Dronenberg,741 F.2d at 1396.

170. Id. at 1396-97.
171. Id. at 1392.
172. Id. at 1388.

173. Sotirios A. Barber, The Ninth Amendment: Inkblot or Another Hard Nut to Crack?,
64 Ci. KENT L. REV. 67, 71-76 (1988).
174. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986).
175. Id.
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States' criminal statutes, run contrary to the long history of sodomy being
illegal,'176 and conflict with practices "firmly rooted in Judaeo-Christian
moral and ethical standards." 17' The dissent in this five to four decision
attacked the Court's opinion as relying upon adherence to religious
doctrine, 178 reliance upon ancient traditions and majoritarianism, 179 and
the majority's refusal to address Equal Protection and Ninth Amendment
arguments.180
Since Bowers, the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed a right
of sexual privacy as it pertains to same sex individuals. The composition
of the Court has and continues to change since 1986. The Bowers majority
ruled against the existence of a Substantive Due Process right to same sex
sexual behavior but the decision could have been decided otherwise if an
Eighth Amendment issue had been raised on appeal.'
The Court, with
the Reagan-Bush appointees, continued to chip away at privacy rights. The
holding in Stanley v. Georgia8 2 was interpreted to be more narrowly
construed.' 83 In the opinion of Justice Scalia, no Substantive Due Process
claim could be made without a showing of the deprivation of a historical
right or traditional protection.'" This attempted extension of Bowers was
criticized, Justice Stevens noting that traditional practices are not immune
from constitutional scrutiny 8l' The divisive issue of abortion and.privacy
rights provided fertile ground to roll back the clock before 1965, or at least
1973. Prior to 1992, the attack on Roe and a right of privacy may have
peaked.8 6 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey," 7 a rare opinion co-authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and
Souter upheld Roe and thereby affirmed the continued existence of a right
to privacy:
176. Id. at 192-94.
177. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
178. Id. at 211-12.

179. Id.
180. Id. at 201-203.
181. DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT To PRIVACY AND THE
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 652-67 (1994). Justice Powell's vacillation prompted a memo
from Justice Stevens: "[W]ith all nine justices participating .. .the Court was 'equally
divided' on the issue." Id. at 661. The decision prompted one commentator to refer to
Bowers as the Plessy of this generation. Id at 686.
182. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
183. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
184. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
185. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 82 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
186. GARROW, supra note 181, at 701.
187. 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
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These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. 8'
And further, addressing the burdens of carrying a pregnancy to term:
Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the state to
without more, upon its own vision of the woman's
insist,
role, however dominant that vision has been in the course
of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman
must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception
89
of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society."
The trio placed extreme reliance upon stare decisis and their reluctance to
reverse an earlier ruling, being Roe, except under the most compelling of
circumstances. 0
Privacy remained intact by the Supreme Court's affirmance of the
existence of a matter so intimate as to be at the core of personal autonomy
and central to the definition of personhood. These matters are protected
from state intrusion by the Fourteenth Amendment. What is to be found at
this core? A woman's right to terminate a non-viable fetus was decided and
has been upheld. Bowers excluded conduct that has been historically
defined as criminal and morally repugnant to the majority.
The Bowers decision will be revisited. The Court's decision addressed
conduct that had been defined by statute as criminal. The Kentucky
Supreme Court found a statutory proscription of same sex sodomy to be
9
violative of equal protection under its constitution. ' That court found a
denial of equal protection when the state criminalized behavior of one group
it found more offensive than another class. Private consensual sexual
activity was not beyond individual liberty protection of the Kentucky
Constitution just because the proscription of certain conduct had ancient
roots. " It has been suggested that had Bowers been argued as an equal
protection case, rather than due process, the result may have been different.
188. Id. at 2807.

189. Id.
190. Roe, 410 U.S. at 2808-16.
191. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).

192. Id. at 493.
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If the Supreme Court should hear a case involving an equal protection
challenge to a statutory proscription of homosexual conduct, the statute
would not survive a strict scrutiny test.193 A similar argument was used
in Hawaii resulting in additional review of the constitutionality of a state
statute permitting heterosexual marriage only." Will the Supreme Court
be asked to resolve an issue of criminally proscribed conduct in one state
versus a state sanctioned license in another?
Prior to implementation of the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, the
military proscription against homosexual personnel was held to be a denial
of equal protection when a discharge was based solely upon status,
unaccompanied by conduct. 9 5 Discrimination on the basis of thoughts
and desires, but not conduct, based on third party prejudice, is a denial of
equal protection applying a rational basis scrutiny.' 96 However, another
court reached the opposite conclusion when conduct was involved and a
higher court had acted. 197 The recently implemented military guidelines
regarding homosexual personnel would not likely survive the analysis
employed in Steffan. These procedures proscribe homosexual conduct. This
conduct is defined as a statement by that person of being a homosexual, or
activity demonstrating a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual
conduct. 9 8 The confusion between status and conduct was noted in
conflicting holdings among different circuits.' 99 A further split in the
circuits was created when the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed the three-judge panel in Steffan.' ° Contrary to this decision, the
Ninth Circuit has held opposite, a statement does not express a desire to
commit homosexual acts.2"' The difference may require resolution by the
Supreme Court.

193. Peter W. Overs Jr., United States v. Fagg: Stretching the Bounds of Privacy, 66
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1193 (1993).
194. Doe v. City and County of Honolulu, 816 P.2d 306, 318 (Haw. 1991); see also
Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (enjoining Amendment 2, voiding anti-gay
discrimination statutes and ordinances).
195. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
196. Id. at 70.
197. Walmer v. United States Dep't of Defense, 835 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Kan. 1993)
(citing Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984)) (discharge due to
false statements of homosexual status).
198. See N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1993, Op-ed section.
199. Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623, 629-30 (10th Cir. 1992).
200. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc). See Wade Lambert,
Appeals Court Upholds Ban on Gays in Military, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1994, at B2.
201. Meinhold v. Department of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1479-80 (9th Cir. 1994). See
Gay Sailor Wins, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at A1O.
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Confusion is also apparent in the political arena. Texas Supreme Court
justices are subject to election. This court heard an appeal voiding the
Texas sodomy statute as a denial of equal protection. This court reversed
on the basis that statute challengers lacked standing. However, by not
addressing the substantive merits, the Texas Supreme Court left standing
2°
another Texas appellate court's holding which voided the statute.
V. CONCLUSION

The adoption process, the author's comments and rationale, and the
concerns voiced by proponents of a bill of rights show that rights existed
and were retained by the people that were not expressly listed in the
Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Ninth Amendment did not create
constitutional rights and is not a source of rights. It is a signpost and a rule
of construction that unenumerated rights do exist. The issue becomes what
rights are unenumerated? The Framers of the Constitution offer no assistance
and the Supreme Court remained silent for almost two centuries. Griswold
is significant for recognizing a constitutional right of privacy and attempting
to interpret the meaning of the Ninth Amendment. It is also significant for
giving breadth and life to the idea that individuals have rights inherent in
their existence, in being human and in being persons. The Constitution is
a living document intended to be adaptable to changing societal needs and
technological advances.
The United States is a system of limited government. The states and
the people delegated powers and reserved rights upon which the government
may not intrude. What right, other than the right of privacy to emotions,
thoughts, and sensations could be more basic and fundamental to a person?
Sexual expression may be the most intimate and private expression of
individuality or personhood. It is not the form, manner or association that
is protected by the Constitution, but a right to be free of governmental
intrusion into private adult consensual sexual matters.
The courts, and particularly the Supreme Court in Bowers, have not
been willing to extend a right of privacy so far. The Bowers Court confused
moral proscriptions with freedom from secular intrusions and coercion by
20 3 The First Amendment
criminal sanctions attached to homosexual acts.
prohibits the establishment of a state religion yet the Bowers Court refers to
religious tenets as a rationale for allowing state control of private matters. 204 The Court also found the duration of the state's sanctions to be
202. John Gallagher, Refusal to Rule, THE ADVocATE, February 22, 1994, at 24-25.
203. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
204. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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relevant.2 5 Previous courts did not find this argument compelling in
striking down anti-miscegenation statutes, 206 separate but equal education
systems' or anti-abortion statutes.' °8 This line of reasoning, followed
in Bowers, Dronenberg and Doe v. City of Richmond substitutes majority
rule for the rights retained by the people as a collection of individual
persons. This concept and its logical conclusion is at odds with a free
pluralistic society.
The court decisions after Griswold have recognized a right to privacy
but have attempted to attach this right's existence and application to an
implicit guarantee in several other express constitutional protections.2"
The courts have sought to follow the majority opinion of Justice Douglas in
Griswold. Douglas' opinion sought to tie an implicit right of privacy to the
express protections of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Each of these could be problematic, and as Judge Bork stated
in Dronenburg,if the implicit guarantee fails, then the penumbral right will
also fail.2" 0 The right of privacy, as defined by Justice Douglas, could
have a limited existence if the courts pursue the line of reasoning of Judge
Bork.
Justice Goldberg did not rely on the supporting express protections.2"1'
The right of privacy was said to exist prior to establishment of the
Constitution or the Bill of Rights.21 Privacy was a right retained by the
people, as stated in the Ninth Amendment. 2 3 Part of the hesitancy of the
judiciary to expand Goldberg's reasoning is well founded. There is not an
explicit text to draw from in defining unenumerated rights. It may be that
the unenumerated right argument is one of last resort, when no explicit text
or implication can be found in the Constitution, but the intent of protecting
some liberty or fundamental freedom can be found or inferred from the
spirit of the Constitution and the necessities and requirements of human
intercourse. The Ninth Amendment may serve as a bastion of civil liberties
and rights against religious or moral majoritarianism as well as serving to
protect the individual from ihe ever increasing possibility of technological
205. Id. at 190, 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
206. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
207. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
208. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
209. See generally Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (1965); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 456 (1972).
210. Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1392 (D.C.Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 746 F.2d
1579 (1984).
211. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 486.
213. Id.
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intrusion into the lives, the minds, thoughts, emotions and sensations of
individuals.
Can a challenge to Bowers be made with a reasonable expectation of
reversing that decision? At this time, it would appear highly unlikely.
Justices White and Blackmun have left the Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O'Connor remain from the Bowers majority and Justice Stevens
from the dissent. Justice Scalia, while a circuit judge, joined in the majority
of Dronenberg and would be expected to uphold Bowers. Justice Thomas
should be expected to follow the lead of his conservative brethren.
The fifth vote could be supplied by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Bader
Ginsburg or Breyer. Justices Souter and Kennedy placed heavy reliance on
stare decisis in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey"4 and would be reluctant to reverse a prior decision except for a
most compelling reason in order to preserve the Court's authority and
legitimacy.2" 5 Justice Bader Ginsburg may side with Justice Stevens,
given her advocacy history, however she has warned that an advocacy career
is not a barometer of judicial performance.2" 6 Justice Stephen Breyer was
a clerk for Justice Goldberg during the term Griswold was decided.
Although not an indication of his vote, it could bring a different perspective
to the Court on this issue.
By taking such a head count, it can hardly be expected that the present
Court would reverse Bowers and expand a right of privacy to adult, private,
consensual sexual activity, by way of substantive due process. The Bowers
majority has foreclosed that route. However, the equal protection argument
is making its way to the Court through a variety of means, as discussed
earlier. This argument provides Justices Kennedy and Souter the opportunity to decide that private, adult, consensual same-sex sexual conduct may be
afforded the same protections from state intrusion as different sex conduct
while avoiding the express reversal of Bowers. A prediction of such an
outcome is highly speculative. The express or implied reversal of Bowers
may need to await another generation of Justices without the homophobic
prejudices cloaked in religious and moral traditions.
The moral tradition advanced by the Bowers majority has lost some of
its persuasiveness as being deeply rooted. This is true when societies of
similar traditions have acted in a contrary manner. Denmark, Sweden and
Norway recognize civil marriages of homosexuals.2" 7 Great Britain has
214. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
215. Id. at 2808-16.
216. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Inviting Judicial Activisim: A 'Liberal' or 'Conservative'
Technique, 15 GA. L. REV. 539, 555 (1981).
217. THE ADVOCATE, July 12, 1994, at 16.
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decriminalized same-sex sexual relations.2"' Further, the European Court
of Human Rights has agreed to hear a case challenging a British law setting
unequal ages of consent. 9 The moral tradition argument is certainly less
compelling without a universal morality shared with those societies which
can be claimed to share a historic moral tradition. 2" Continued adherence
to such a moral tradition argument calls into question the legitimacy of the
Court, and its decisions, in an increasingly pluralistic society.
The logical extension of Griswold privacy is a recognition that sexual
intimacy and expression is at the core of any definition of humanness and
personhood. This sphere of personal autonomy is not to be intruded upon
by the state when the participants engage in adult, private, consensual
sexual behavior. To allow otherwise is to invite majoritarian dictation, by
legal process, of what is defined as good by the majority, not unlike the
treatment of nineteenth century Mormons or leftist political activists in the
early decades of this century.22' The framers of the American Constitution, authors of the Bill of Rights and those individuals voting for ratification were of a generation fresh from an armed struggle in response to what
they felt was an intrusive government. Is the Bill of Rights an exhaustive
list of proscribed state intrusion? Some rights were considered so inherent
in the nature of man so as to be self-evident and not requiring enumeration.
Private, adult, consensual sexual expression is such a right. A right to be
free of intrusion in the bedroom is not to convey special treatment to a
minority. It is a right to be left alone, a right of privacy necessary to be
human.
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